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Philosophy is often caricatured as one of the most disconnected and anaemic academic 
enterprises. Yet in philosophers’ own accounts of what drew them to the problems they 
have sought to address they answer, typically, in two broad, passionate, ways: wonder or 
anxiety. As such, philosophy, and philosophers’ self-understanding of themselves and 
their enterprise, can serve as a way to address some of the important topics raised by 
Rosfort and Stanghellini. Even for philosophers, the emotional experience of moods and 
affects is employed in narrativity, or at least, employed when one is called to give an 
account of oneself. One could envisage a party conversation along these lines: 
 
‘So why did you become a philosopher?’ 
‘Well, I wanted to go to university but wasn’t interested in science or in the humanities 
and I’ve always been dreadful at languages’. 
‘(Laugh) But you must like something about it as you wouldn’t have become a 
Professor?’ 
‘You know how it is… you drift into things.  I did well as an undergraduate, my tutor 
suggested I should do a PhD. Found an excellent supervisor, and got a few papers 
published and then a teaching post…’ 
‘You must be very committed to the subject’ 
‘Ummm – I guess so.  I thought about joining the civil service after my PhD, but always 
managed to find work and the hours are much more flexible at universities!’ 
‘Well I think it is amazing: to think and teach about such important things’ 
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‘Do you?’ 
 
There is something slightly baffling here that may simply be part of the inherent irony 
and self-deprecation of some academics. The philosopher’s interlocutor is asking about 
what philosophy means to the philosopher: why he has given his life to it. As such, she is 
alluding to a deeper, philosophical question that, after decades of falling out of favour, is 
returning to the attention of philosophers: namely, how has philosophy given your life 
meaning? The philosopher responds with possible irony, banality, superficiality and 
invokes luck rather than meaning in his narrative. He serves as Nietzsche’s feared 
nihilist. The account offered also seems to fail to meet normative standards, and 
depending on how the philosopher carries it off, this gap between expectation and reality 
in the conversation may generate humour.  
 
However, the greater likelihood is that the conversation will engender perplexity and 
disappointment in the interviewer. Rather like the characters in Evelyn Waugh’s early 
novels, the philosopher is buffeted passively by life and luck and eschews agency or 
meaning. In Waugh’s skilled hands this becomes tragic comedy; for the philosopher and 
his interlocutor we have disconnection and sadness. The crucial reason for this is that we 
need to use terms referring to moods, affects, meaning, emotion, when we offer an 
account of ourselves and when we try to understand ourselves. Otherwise something is 
missing and the reason a person gives for their actions either look like poor reasons or not 
reasons at all (Bortolotti and Broome, in press). Further, agency, rationality and self-
knowledge may themselves be dependent upon reason-giving  
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 In invoking moods and affects in one’s narrative the practical understanding (or 
‘affordances’) of the world one inhabits are laid open in clear view. Hence Aristotle’s 
account of wonder as the stimulus for philosophy. Aristotle says:  ‘For it is owing to their 
wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered 
originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties 
about the greater matters’ (1984, pg. 1554). Conversely, given the experience of 
transcendence, of ambiguity, of finitude rather than wondrous awe, the philosopher may 
be motivated by anxiety (Kant’s awakening from his dogmatic slumbers, Heidegger’s 
battles with ‘Crisis’ and the flight of the gods). Either manner of accounting for one’s 
interest seems to work normatively in the giving of reasons and in generating a narrative, 
and moreover, a philosophical narrative. 
 
Our fictional dialogue and discussion above aims to reinforce the important link between 
narrative, reason-giving and moods and affects argued for by Rosfort and Stanghellini. 
To make our accounts carry weight, we need to invoke feelings, affects, moods, meaning, 
and purpose. However, we would seek to extend this point. In their clear taxonomy of 
mental states, they suggest that emotions are ‘characterized by their connection to 
motivation and movement’ (authors’ italics, pg 13 of ms) and that the ‘feeling dimension 
of emotion is what permits [us] to distinguish emotion among other cognitive functions 
(perception, deliberation, evaluation, judging etc.)’ (pg. 14 of ms). This latter quote is 
somewhat grammatically opaque but the idea seems to be that ‘feeling’ allows us, given 
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the discriminatory function Rosfort and Stanghellini attribute to it, to pick out emotional 
states from other non-feeling non-emotional cognitive functions. 
 
Rosfort and Stanghellini’s account is Heideggerian in several ways. Their view of the 
person as ‘being in the world’, their sophisticated understanding of attunement as 
constitutive to identity and action and the overall view of Dasein’s (the human being) 
existence as care, are at the heart of their view. On Heidegger’s account in Being and 
Time, the minimal unit of meaning is ‘being in the world’ (in-der-Welt-sein). This unit is 
not dissimilar to Damasio’s. The minimal, or core, self is the embodied (if under-
developed) self Heidegger describes as always already in a world, always already 
embodied. The autobiographical self is the temporal self, or the Heideggerian ‘thrown-
projection’.  
 
For Heidegger, describing human existence as ‘thrown’ signals our embedded and 
contextual existence. A person is always thrown into a world, a habitus, an environment. 
There is an element of givenness to us, captured by the thought that we each have a past 
that is at least temporally given, fixed.  We also project ourselves into a future – into 
projects, plans and hopes that direct our current behaviour and put it in a meaningful 
relation to the future. This relationship of our present to our past and our future 
constitutes the temporal dimension of human existence, or what Damasio calls the 
autobiographical self. 
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The connection Rosfort and Stanghellini make to narrative towards the end of the paper is 
important. Viewing narrativity in relation to temporality and self-reflection provides a 
full picture of the person as existing in time. It also grounds the ability for therapeutic 
change in this particular picture of the person. We can modify our relationship to our past 
(through psychotherapy, religious conversion and so on) and it is this capacity for 
modification, for re-telling, that is significant to Rosfort and Stanghellini’s emphasis on 
narrativity. Such a modification, in turn, will affect the way in which we view, and act 
towards, the future. So modifying the ways in which we understand ourselves may 
change both our relationship to the past and to the future.  
 
It is important to note here that by ‘understanding’ (verstehen) Heidegger does not mean 
reflective or passive cognitive understanding. Rather, his term is loaded with active and 
pragmatic meaning, as well as with affective force. We understand ourselves through and 
in our actions, choices, forms of engagement with the world and with ourselves. We are 
not neutral about our life story and events; we have preferences and these preferences are 
expressed in the emotional response we have towards future scenarios. Compare your 
emotional response to being invited to eat ice-cream in the sun, to the one evoked by 
being thrown into a dark dungeon. One way in which we can reflect and assess future 
plans and projects is by tuning in to our affective responses to them.  
 
This pragmatic and emotive view of one’s self-understanding and reflexive evaluation as 
action-based and emotionally coloured brings together the core and autobiographical 
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selves. It demonstrates the centrality of emotion to all aspects of human perception and 
reflection, including the cognitive and rational spheres.  
 
The pragmatic view of ‘understanding’ points us to a missing aspect of Heidegger’s 
attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the self. This is the embodied dimension 
of existence he only gestures towards in isolated comments in Being and Time. In order 
to bring together the core and autobiographical selves, we need a unified account of 
human mind and body, such as the one provided by Merleau-Ponty. If our self 
understanding is pragmatic and grounded in concrete actions and attitudes, it must also be 
embodied and intimately linked to our physical capacities and actions. As Rosfort and 
Stanghellini write, “This view is aimed at putting person, body and world together again” 
(p.11). This suggested reconciliation also applies to the realm of emotions, where the 
authors suggest synthesising ‘feeling theories’ and ‘cognitive theories’, as emotions are 
rooted in both physiological reactions and psychological phenomena (pp.12-3). 
  
However, can we think about a cognitive state that is worthy of its name, that would not 
be connected to motivation and movement? We should not rely on an assumption of 
transparency of one’s mental states to oneself to delineate whether ‘feeling is present’ but 
rather keep Rosfort and Stanghellini’s helpful, almost behaviouristic, definition in mind: 
for us to notice anything, to take up an attitude or stance towards anything in the world or 
in our own consciousness, requires it to be salient and for us to care about it.  As with 
Davidson’s assault on scheme-content dualism, it seems rather incoherent to think that 
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we are presented with some neutral “given”, which we then subsequently appraise or 
conceptualize in an emotional manner.  
 
Instead, one could learn from McDowell and reject the dualism between recognition and 
emotional response, without rejecting the duality.  For us to notice anything, to entertain 
any conscious representations, requires meaning and value to be present, and for us to 
take up a stance towards it. Recognition implies an affective response: if we didn’t care, 
we wouldn’t notice. (Bortolotti and Broome, 2007). Hence we would suggest that all 
mental states we are aware of and those that are connected with action have to be 
affective in some form or another. To consider the alternative, brings the idea of a 
dispassionate, impotent, unconnected and passive agent and with it the dangers of 
solipsism, Cartesianism, and what McDowell (1994) refers to as ‘frictionless spinning in 
the void’. A mind internally coherent, but with no intentionality towards the world. 
 
Rosfort and Stanghellini make good sense in their discussion of how moods and affects 
can arise from one another. Clinically, the clearest example may be that of the patient 
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after a severe life-threatening trauma: this 
would result in a pronounced affect, and an entirely different world subsequently being 
inhabited due to an altered mood state. We refer to this as ‘hypervigilance’ but that term 
barely captures the profound existential changes. The world is now a place with an 
absence of safe havens, everyone is a potential threat: there is no rest.  
Putting psychopathology to one side, and considering the role affects and moods play in 
our own self-understanding and understanding of others, one can see how the self is 
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directly constituted by the stories we tell around our affective connections to the world. 
Some affects are received passively to some extent: our friend dies, we get attacked, and 
although we can choose and have some degree of freedom as to how we interpret and 
appraise these events, they may lead to more long-standing changes in mood. Conversely, 
we can choose to generate strong affects in ourselves. Rather like Aristotle’s teaching 
regarding the acquisition of virtue, can we seek out affective states with a view to altering 
our mood and person-hood? 
 
In contrast to the sufferer of PTSD, would the ‘adrenaline-junkie’ inhabit a different 
world of different affordances?  By exposure to threatening, but positively appraised, 
events that lead to profound affects would there be a resultant change in mood, 
attunement, and mode of care towards the world? Would the dominant mode of 
affordance be that of a challenge, of a cause of excitement? Some of these techniques of 
exposing an individual to certain affective states that they may not seek out voluntarily 
could be viewed as one of the mechanisms utilized in psychotherapy, whether 
psychodynamic (transference) or cognitive-behavioural (‘behavioural experiments’).  
Pronounced affects are manipulated in a safe environment by the therapist with the hope 
that longstanding changes in mood are engendered and a different world of affordances is 
attained.   
 
Finally, it is the questioning nature of the person brought out by Rosfort and Stanghellini 
that is central to philosophy. They describe the person as ‘position-taking’ and 
‘questioning being’. And it is the evaluative stance and its reflexive mode, that are core to 
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philosophy’s understanding of the self and of itself. This account moves beyond 
Damasio’s ‘evolutionary conglomerate’ and adds a philosophical dimension to human 
existence itself, not only to its description. On this view, the trait that picks out human 
existence from other kinds of biological existence is the ability to self-reflect, to evaluate 
and position oneself in relation to both a physical and a social environment. And it is this 
evaluative dimension that Rosfort and Stanghellini see as not only cognitive but also 
emotive. 
 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein, the human being, as the creature whose existence (and 
therefore nonexistence) is an issue for it, resonates with Rosfort and Stanghellini’s 
account. As Heidegger writes: “That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very 
Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance 
or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities 
such as these, their Being is ‘a matter of indifference’; or more precisely, they ‘are’ such 
that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite.”  
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 67-68).  
 
Additionally, and importantly for Rosfort and Stanghellini, Heidegger views this 
questioning activity as intimately linked to different kinds of moods. Some moods are 
more disclosive than others. Some moods, notably anxiety, reveal to us the world as a 
whole. Heidegger’s taxonomy of  Stimmungen ‘moods’ and Befindlichkeit ‘states of 
mind’ (or affectivity, to use Hubert Dreyfus’ translation), is in agreement with Rosfort 
and Stanghellini’s emphasis on moods as character-building and essential to moral and 
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self evaluation. Moods play an important interpretative role in helping us situate 
ourselves in relation to a specific context or situation, in relation to the world as a whole 
and also in relation to ourselves. As Heidegger writes in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, “with every mood wherein ‘something is this way or that’, our Dasein 
becomes manifest to us” (1973/1990, p.155).  
 
Moods are also related to our thrownness and sociality. In the same way that we ‘find 
ourselves’ in a particular world, society and context, we also ‘find ourselves’ in a mood. 
Our mood is also the background of our communication with others and our social world. 
And most importantly for our discussion here, moods also ground our understanding – 
our self-interpretation and self-understanding of ourselves as being in a particular world 
(Carel 2006). 
 
Moods are not epiphenomenal to our uncovering of the world; they are rather constitutive 
of this uncovering. They reveal the world, disclose our thrownness into it and enable us 
to respond to it. Moods are also the core of our openness to the world. They show us the 
world as something that can affect us. Different moods are different ways to realise our 
relationship to the world. In this sense they are not subjective or internal. Rather, they 
reflect a relation between us and our world (ibid.). 
 
It is ultimately the significant role moods play as reflexive evaluators, that ties together 
the sophisticated cognitive functions of the autobiographical self to the visceral and pre-
reflective core self. They also overcome the gulf between ‘feeling theories’ and 
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‘cognitive theories’ of emotion. By viewing moods as contributing to the person’s 
continuously updated reflective equilibrium we can see moods as playing a crucial role in 
the construction of personhood and as tying together mind and body which were 
artificially split by Cartersian dualist tradition. As Rosfort and Stanghellini write: 
“[moods] awake questions, doubts, considerations, evaluations and finally deliberations 
about my-being-this-person” (p.21).  
 
So counter to the common understanding (and self-understanding) of philosophy as 
rational, cerebral, based on reason and argument, Rosfort and Stanghellini’s paper opens 
the way for us to see philosophy as requiring mood, containing a sometimes implicit 
emotional tonality and colouring and as being a form of attunement to the world, in both 
senses of the word: attunement as a form of listening or tuning in and attunement as 
affect, as a mood through which we are able to perceive the world at all. To return to our 
listless philosopher: he was not devoid of affect regarding his chosen profession, but 
displaying boredom or presenting himself in a restrained way. And these are not lack of 
mood, but a particular affectivity that discloses something about his particular vision of 
philosophy. 
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